COMMENT by unknown
COMMffENT.
COMMENT.
A case putting in issue the constitutionality of the income tax
has just been decided in the Supreme Court of the District of
Columbia- the opinion is by Mr. Justice Hagner, and, as reported
in the newspapers, it affirms the validity of the tax.
In view of this decision and of the general interest in the mat-
ter to-day, we think it may be convenient to place briefly before
our readers a summary of former proceedings in the Supreme
Court of the United States, wherein taxes of this character have
been under consideration. The point that has been chiefly dis-
cussed has, of course, been whether such a tax is direct, and there-
fore to be apportioned, or whether it is a duty or excise.
The question as to what was a direct tax first arose in the
Supreme Court in 1796, in the case of Hylton v. U. S., 3 Dallas,
17:. Congress had laid a tax on carriages, and the plaintiff in
this case, as owner for his own use of more than one hundred car-
riages, resisted the tax, claiming that it was a direct tax and, not
being apportioned, was unconstitutional. The court decided
against this, laying weight on the fact that great injustice would
result from an apportionment of a tax of that character, falling as
it would, veiry heavily on owners of carriages in a State where
there were but few of such vehicles, and lightly on owners in
those States where carriages were in more general use. The
court then expressed the opinion that direct taxes, in the sense of
the Constitution, include only capitation taxes and taxes on land.
The opinion of Iredell, J. (p. 18i) after stating that Congress
has the power to tax all taxable objects, except duties on exports,
subject only to the two well known. restrictions, viz.: that direct
taxes must be apportioned, and all duties, imposts, and excises
must be uniform, continues:
" If it," i. e., the carriage tax, "can be considered as a tax"
"neither direct, within the meaning of the Constitution, nor"
"comprehended within the term duty, impost, or excise, there"
"is no provision in the Constitution one way or the other, and"
"then it must be left to such an operation of the power, as if"
"the authority to lay taxes had been given generally in all"
"instances."
The question of direct taxes was again discussed by the
Supreme Court of the United States in z868, in the case of Pacific
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Union Co. v. Soule, 7 Wall. 434. In this case the Court decided
that an income tax upon amounts insured, renewed, or continued
by insurance companies upon the gross amounts of premiums
received and assessments made by them, and also upon dividends,
undistributed sums, and income is not a direct tax, but a duty or
excise. The opinion of the Court, delivered by Mr. Justice
Swayne, referred to the case of Hylton v. U. S., supra, with the
remark that the opinion as to what were direct taxes expressed in
that case had been subsequently adopted by Chancellor Kent and
Judge Story. It then defined the taxing power of Congress as
follows:
"The taxing power is given in the most comprehensive"
"terms. The. only limitations imposed are that direct taxes,"
"including the capitation tax, shall be apportioned, that duties,"
"imposts, and excises shall be uniform, and that no duties shall "
"be imposed upon articles exported from any State. With these"
"exceptions the exercise of the power is in all respects unfettered."
As to the question immediately in issue in the case, the Court
says:
"If the tax in question were apportioned, it would fall very"
"lightly on some States where the insurance companies are"
numerous and rich, and very hardly on others. It cannot be "
"supposed that the framers of the Constitution intended that"
"any tax should be apportioned, the collection of which on that"
"principle would be attended with such results. The conse-"
"quences are fatal to the proposition. To the question under"
"consideration it must be answered that the tax to which it"
"relates is not a direct tax, but a duty or excise."
But the subject received a more thorough examination of the
Supreme Court in i88o, in the case of Springer v. U. S., io2 U. S.
586, in which the.opinion of the Court was again delivered by Mr.
Justice Swayne, who therein cites the following passage from Ham-
ilton's works, vol. 7, P. 848. "What is the distinction between"
"direct and indirect taxes? It is a matter of regret that terms"
"so uncertain and vague on so important a point are to be found"
"in the Constitution. We shall seek in vain for any antecedent "
"settled legal meaning to the respective terms. There is none."
"We shall be as much at a loss to find any disposition of either"
"which can satisfactorily determine the point." He suggests
that the boundary line between direct and indirect taxes be settled
by "a species of arbitration," and "that direct taxes be held to"
"be only capitation or poll taxes, and taxes on lands and build-"
"ings, and general assessments, whether on the whole proper* of"
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"individuals, or on their whole real or personal estate. All else"
" must of necessity be considered as indirect taxes."
The opinion goes on to show that the tax in question does not fall
within either of these categories. "It is not a tax on the whole"
"personal estate of the individual, but only on his income, gains,"
"and profits during a year, which may have been but a small"
"part of his personal estate, and in most cases would have been "
"so." The Court then refers to the former Acts of Congress,
laying direct taxes, showing that the Acts of July 14, 1798, August
2, 1813, and January 19, 1815, were laid on real estate and on
slaves, and the Act of August 5, i86i, on real estate only, and
continues: "In all of these Acts the aggregate amount required"
"to be collected was apportioned among the several States. It"
"will thus be seen that whenever the government has imposed"
"a tax which it recognized as a direct tax, it has never been "
"applied to any objects but real estate and slaves." The opinion
reviews the cases of Hylton v. U. S. and Pacific Co. v. Soule, su ra,
and Yeazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533, quoting from this case the
following remark of Mr. Chief Justice Chase: "It may rightly"
"be affirmed that in the practical construction of the Constitution"
"by Congress, direct taxes have been limited to taxes on land"
"and appurtenances, and taxes on polls or capitation taxes."
The opinion concludes in these words: "Our conclusions are,"
"that direct taxes, within the meaning of the Constitution, are"
"only capitation taxes as expressed in that instrument, and taxes"
"on real estate, and that the tax of which the plaintiff in error"
"complains, is within the category of an excise or duty."
It would appear that the following propositions are established
by the foregoing decisions, viz.: that Congress may tax all tax-
able objects except exports, provided that direct taxes are appor-
tioned, and that all others are uniform; that direct taxes, in the
constitutional sense, include only capitation or poll taxes, and
taxes on real estate; and that a tax on real estate, to come within
the definition, must be laid on the whole estate, and not on any
gains, income, or profits derived from it during a year.
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